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JOINT VENTURES—ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS: 
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT CREATES A 
BROADER DEFINITION OF JOINT VENTURES 
Sandvick v. LaCrosse, 2008 ND 77, 747 N.W.2d 519 
 
I. FACTS 
In May 1996, Joedy Bragg, Frank Haughton, William LaCrosse, and 
Monte Sandvick purchased three oil and gas leases in Golden Valley 
County, North Dakota.1  The oil and gas leases, known as the Horn Leases, 
were standard, paid-up leases with terms of five years.2  The leases 
contained no provision for extension or renewal.3  LaCrosse owned Empire 
Oil Company, which held record title to the leases.4  The parties purchased 
the leases through their credits in the Empire Oil Company JV checking 
account.5 
In addition to the Horn Leases, the parties developed relationships with 
one another through previously owned oil and gas leases.6  Bragg and Sand-
vick alleged that the parties discussed extending the original Horn Leases 
upon their expiration.7  However, Haughton and LaCrosse claimed that 
such conversations never occurred.8  In November 2000, Haughton and La-
Crosse purchased three oil and gas leases on the same Golden Valley 
County property.9  These leases were known as the Horn Top Leases and 
were to be leased at the expiration of the Horn Leases, as they covered the 
same acreage.10  Before purchasing the Horn Top Leases, Haughton and La-
Crosse twice offered to purchase Bragg and Sandvick’s interests in the 
Horn Leases, but Bragg and Sandvick refused.11 
 
1. Sandvick v. LaCrosse, 2008 ND 77, ¶ 2, 747 N.W.2d 519, 520. 




6. Id. ¶ 3. 
7. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, Sandvick v. LaCrosse, 2008 ND 77, 747 N.W.2d 519 
(No. 20070146). 
8. Brief for Defendants-Appellee at 5, Sandvick v. LaCrosse, 2008 ND 77, 747 N.W.2d 519 
(No. 20070146). 
9. Sandvick, ¶ 4, 747 N.W.2d at 520. 
10. Id. at 521. 
11. Id. 
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In 2004, Bragg and Sandvick sued Haughton and LaCrosse under part-
nership law, claiming that they breached their fiduciary duties by not offer-
ing Bragg and Sandvick an opportunity to purchase the Horn Top Leases.12  
While the parties agreed that they shared profits, losses, and expenses, no 
written document established a partnership or joint venture relationship.13  
But Bragg and Sandvick claimed that they had orally agreed to form a part-
nership relationship, and argued that oral agreements, rather than written 
agreements, are customary in the oil and gas industry.14  The district court 
found in favor of Haughton and LaCrosse and held that no partnership or 
joint venture existed.15  Bragg and Sandvick appealed the district court’s 
judgment.16 
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case.17  
The court held that while there was no partnership relationship, a joint 
venture relationship existed.18  Additionally, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court found that Haughton and LaCrosse breached their fiduciary duties.19  
The Sandvick court remanded the case to address and determine damages.20 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Sandvick v. LaCrosse21 implicates various areas of law including top 
leases and the differences between partnership and joint venture relation-
ships.22  First, partnership relationships are examined.  Joint venture 
relationships are then discussed.  Next, the fiduciary duties of partnerships 
and joint ventures are analyzed.  Finally, top leases are explained. 
A. A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF PARTNERSHIPS 
General partnerships, limited partnerships, and limited liability partner-
ships are three types of partnership relationships.23  Most partnerships are 
 
12. Id. ¶ 5, 747 N.W.2d at 521. 
13. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 7, at 9 (explaining that there was no writ-
ten document). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 17. 




20. Id. ¶ 20, 747 N.W.2d at 524. 
21. 2008 ND 77, 747 N.W.2d 519. 
22. See discussion infra Parts II.A-D (analyzing partnerships, joint ventures, fiduciary duties, 
and top leases). 
23. See discussion infra Parts II.A.1-2 (explaining general partnership law, as well as North 
Dakota partnership law); see also JEROLD A. FRIEDLAND, UNDERSTANDING PARTNERSHIP AND 
LLC TAXATION 11 (2d ed. 2003) (listing and defining the common types of partnerships).  A 
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general partnerships.24  General partnership law provides common concepts 
of partnership law that are essential in understanding most partnership rela-
tionships.25  Therefore, general partnership relationships are discussed first.  
General partnerships are then examined in the context of North Dakota law. 
1. Overview of General Partnership Law 
The Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) is the foremost guide for partner-
ship law.26  Today, most practitioners and commentators use a revised ver-
sion of the UPA.27  The UPA rules focus on the relationships among part-
ners as well as the relationships between partnerships and third parties.28 
The original UPA defined a partnership as “an association of two or 
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”29  The revised 
UPA (RUPA) states that “the association of two or more persons to carry on 
as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the 
persons intend to form a partnership.”30  While no exclusive test is used to 
determine the existence of a partnership, parties are considered to be part-
ners when they agree, by their acts, conduct, or an agreement, that they in-
tend to carry on as co-owners of a business and share in profits, losses, and 
expenses.31 
 
limited partnership must have two or more parties. Id.  At least one of the partners involved in the 
limited partnership must be a general partner and one must be a limited partner. Id.  In limited 
partnerships, the general partner has unlimited personal liability, while the limited partner is only 
liable for the amount he or she invested into the limited partnership. Id.  A limited liability 
partnership is a partnership in which the partners are not personally liable for certain partnership 
debts. Id.  Liability differs from state to state, but in limited liability partnerships, a partner is 
usually only personally liable when he or she has acted negligently or committed wrongful 
conduct. Id. 
24. FRIEDLAND, supra note 23, at 10. 
25. See id. (discussing general partnership law). 
26. DAVID S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND LLCS 190 (2d ed. 2002); see 
discussion infra Parts II.A.2 (analyzing North Dakota partnership law); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP 
ACT Prefatory Note 1, 1 (1997) [hereinafter Prefatory Note].  Developing a uniform law of 
partnership was first considered in 1902. Id.  The National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws originally developed the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) in 1914.  
KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 190.  The UPA provided guidelines for general partnerships and 
limited partnerships.  Prefatory Note, supra note 26, at 1.  The UPA was adopted in all states, with 
the exception of Louisiana. Id. 
27. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 190; Prefatory Note, supra note 26, at 1-2.  In 1987, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) decided to begin revi-
sions on the UPA. Id. at 1.  In 1992, the NCCUSL adopted a revised version of the UPA. Id.  The 
NCCUSL again revised the UPA and adopted a new version in 1994, 1996, and 1997.  
KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 1, 190.  While the NCCUSL refers to each version as the UPA, 
many practitioners refer to the revised act as the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA). Id. 
28. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 191. 
29. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1) (1914); see KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 193. 
30. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 202(a) (1997); see KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 193. 
31. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 193-94. 
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Partnerships are usually classified into three types: partnerships at will, 
partnerships for a term, and partnerships for a particular undertaking.32  
When parties are involved in a partnership at will, any party is entitled to 
end the partnership at any time, even without cause.33  If the parties are in-
volved in a partnership for a term, they are in an agreement to be in the 
partnership for a specified time.34  Finally, if the parties are involved in a 
partnership for a particular undertaking, the partnership ends when the spe-
cific task or goal is complete.35  The goal or task is usually specified in the 
partnership agreement.36 
In Estate of Zimmerman,37 which involved a spouse’s property in an 
augmented estate, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that uniform laws, 
such as the revised UPA, are used in a uniform manner; this means that 
courts can and should consult other jurisdictions that have adopted the uni-
form statutes when interpreting the statute’s meaning.38  However, the court 
also explained that it has the authority to use decisions from other states in 
order to further interpret the law.39  Therefore, in the following section, 
North Dakota partnership law is examined, as the North Dakota Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of partnership law is important to understand.40 
2. North Dakota Partnership Law 
In 1995, North Dakota adopted the revised UPA.41  The North Dakota 
Century Code, using the revised UPA’s definition, identified partnership as 
“an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business 
for profit.”42  Although North Dakota has adopted the revised UPA, the fol-
lowing sections further examine basic partnership concepts in the context of 
North Dakota law.43  First, the definition of a North Dakota partnership is 
discussed.  The elements of a North Dakota partnership are then explained.  
Finally, the standard of review for a North Dakota partnership is examined. 
 





37. 2001 ND 155, 633 N.W.2d. 594. 
38. Estate of Zimmerman, ¶ 14, 633 N.W.2d at 599. 
39. Id. 
40. See discussion infra Parts II.A.2 (analyzing North Dakota partnership law). 
41. Ziegler v. Dahl, 2005 ND 10, ¶ 14, 691 N.W.2d 271, 275 (citing Uniform Partnership 
Act § 202, cmt. 1 (1997)). 
42. N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-13-01(19) (2007). 
43. See discussion infra Parts II.A.2.a-c (defining terms, explaining elements, and discussing 
the standard of review for a North Dakota partnership). 
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a. Definition of a Partnership 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has defined partnership in many 
cases.44  While the court uses the definition provided in the revised UPA, 
North Dakota case law has further construed the North Dakota Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the definition.45  This section reviews North Da-
kota cases that provide the North Dakota Supreme Court’s analysis of the 
definition of a partnership.46 
In Gangl v. Gangl,47 the parties brought an action involving a family 
farming relationship.48  Anton Gangl, the plaintiff, alleged that the parties 
had a working arrangement that was equivalent to a partnership, and that 
the assets of their arrangement should be divided among the parties.49  The 
district court held that no partnership existed because Gangl failed to 
establish evidence to show that one existed.50  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision.51 
The Gangl court used the North Dakota Century Code definition of 
partnership and further illustrated how to prove the existence of a partner-
ship.52  The Gangl court first established that one specific test is not used to 
determine whether a partnership exists.53  Instead, the determination is 
based on the facts and circumstances of each case.54  However, the Gangl 
court suggested that, with the statutory definition, specific elements are im-
portant when determining the existence of a partnership.55  The court clari-
fied three essential elements in showing a partnership exists:  (1) an as-
sociation, or an intention to be partners; (2) co-ownership and a community 
of interest in the business; and (3) a profit motive.56  Through Gangl, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court established the groundwork for the definition 
 
44. See, e.g., Gangl v. Gangl, 281 N.W.2d 574, 579 (N.D. 1979) (quoting the North Dakota 
Century Code). 
45. See, e.g,, Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky, 2003 ND 110, ¶ 7, 666 N.W.2d 444, 446 (discussing 
North Dakota’s interpretation of the definition of partnership). 
46. See discussion infra Parts II.A.2.a (discussing the definition of partnership through North 
Dakota case law). 
47. 281 N.W.2d 574 (N.D. 1979). 
48. Gangl, 281 N.W 2d. at 576. 
49. Id. 
50. Id.  
51. Id. 
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of a partnership.57  The court has further developed the definition of a 
partnership in later cases.58 
In Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky,59 Edward Tarnavsky, the plaintiff, argued 
that the lower court erred when it did not find that a partnership or business 
arrangement existed between he and his brother, Morris Tarnavsky.60  
Edward and Morris ranched and farmed together under an informal 
arrangement.61  Edward sued Morris and claimed that their informal ar-
rangement was a partnership.62  Edward sought “dissolution and an ac-
counting of partnership profits and assets.”63  However, Morris denied that 
their arrangement was a partnership and counterclaimed for payments he 
claimed he had made on behalf of Edward, in order to satisfy a previous 
federal court judgment.64  The trial court ruled in favor of Morris and held 
that no partnership existed because Edward was unable to establish co-
ownership.65  Edward appealed, claiming that the trial court erred when it 
did not find a partnership.66  Additionally, Edward argued that he was 
entitled to some partnership assets that Morris had prevented him from 
obtaining.67 
In its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court again looked to the 
North Dakota Century Code to define partnership.68  Similarly to Gangl, the 
court held that three essential elements of partnership exist:  (1) intent to be 
partners; (2) co-ownership of the business; and (3) profit motive.69  Because 
Edward was unable to establish co-ownership of any items of property, and 
because he was unable to show intent to create a partnership, the court held 
that the evidence did not sufficiently show that a partnership had been 
established.70 
Through Gangl and Tarnavsky, the North Dakota Supreme Court de-
fined partnership by establishing the critical elements needed to prove the 
 
57. Id. 
58. See, e.g., Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky, 2003 ND 110, ¶ 7, 666 N.W.2d 444, 446 (interpreting 
the definition of partnership). 
59. 2003 ND 110, 666 N.W.2d 444. 
60. Tarnavsky, ¶ 6, 666 N.W.2d at 446. 
61. Id. ¶ 4. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id.  
65. Id. ¶¶ 4, 8. 
66. Id. ¶ 6. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. ¶ 7 (quoting Gangl v. Gangl, 281 N.W.2d 574, 579 (N.D. 1979)). 
69. Id.; see Gangl, 281 N.W.2d at 579 (N.D. 1979) (reiterating the partnership elements). 
70. Tarnavsky, ¶ 8, 666 N.W.2d at 446. 
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existence of a partnership.71  Identifying essential elements of a partnership 
is important, but discovering what the North Dakota Supreme Court has 
found to be adequate in meeting these elements is critical.72  In Ziegler v. 
Dahl,73 the North Dakota Supreme Court further articulated the three ele-
ments needed to prove the existence of a partnership.74 
b. Elements of a Partnership 
In Ziegler, Michael Ziegler and Jack Kirsch claimed that they were in a 
partnership relationship with Steve Dahl, David Tronson, and James Lega-
cie.75  Dahl, Tronson, and Legacie marketed an ice fishing guide service on 
Devils Lake in 1997, after the completion of the 1996-1997 ice fishing sea-
son.76  While the three shared clients and marketing expenses, they agreed 
to work as independent contractors and to obtain their own licenses and 
equipment.77  Near the end of the 1998-1999 ice fishing season, Dahl asked 
Ziegler and Kirsch to assist in guiding.78  After the completion of the 1999 
ice fishing season, the parties orally agreed that each party would receive 
his payments from different clients.79  Additionally, the parties each wrote a 
check to Dahl for $813.97.80  Ziegler and Kirsch later claimed that the 
checks were for an initial capital investment, while Dahl claimed they were 
for future marketing expenses.81  In 2000, Dahl, Tronson, and Legacie 
continued to guide under the name Perch Patrol.82  However, Dahl, 
Tronson, and Legacie informed Ziegler and Kirsch that Ziegler and Kirsch 
could no longer guide with Dahl, Tronson, and Legacie.83  The district court 
granted a motion for summary judgment dismissing Ziegler and Kirsch’s 
claim that they were in a partnership with Dahl, Tronson, and Legacie.84  
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, based on the finding that 
 
71. Id. ¶ 7; Gangl, 281 N.W.2d at 579. 
72. See Ziegler v. Dahl, 2005 ND 10, ¶¶ 13-26, 691 N.W.2d 271, 275-78 (identifying and 
explaining the elements of a North Dakota partnership). 
73. 2005 ND 10, 691 N.W.2d 271. 
74. Ziegler, ¶¶ 13-26, 691 N.W.2d at 275-78. 
75. Id. ¶ 1, 691 N.W.2d at 273. 
76. Id. ¶ 2. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. ¶ 3. 
79. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. 
80. Id. ¶ 6. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. ¶ 7, 691 N.W.2d at 274. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. ¶ 8. 
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Ziegler and Kirsch were unable to show that the first two partnership 
elements existed in their relationship with the defendants.85 
Ziegler illustrated that establishing each partnership element is impera-
tive to prove the existence of a partnership.86  The following sections ex-
plain each of the essential elements in establishing a partnership under 
North Dakota law.  First, the element of intent is explained.  Next, co-
ownership is discussed.  Finally, the profit motive element is examined. 
i. Intent by Partners 
Ziegler stated that demonstrating intent to form a partnership is one of 
the most important steps in proving the existence of a partnership.87  In 
1995, North Dakota adopted the revised UPA’s definition, which added the 
phrase, “whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership,” to the 
existing definition.88  This language informs parties that they could become 
partners by demonstrating intent through their actions alone, even if they 
explicitly stated that their relationship was not a partnership.89 
In Gangl, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the requisite in-
tent is met when the different parties want to work together and be a part of 
a relationship that includes the other essential elements required of a part-
nership.90  So long as parties aim to work together in a co-ownership 
relationship with the sharing of profits, the element of intent is met.91  The 
court further emphasized that intent is not something that must be stated 
outright.92  Therefore, if intent is shown through the actions of the parties, 
parties cannot simply state that they are not involved in a partnership, they 
must show it.93  A partnership can only exist if there is a form of intent 
among the parties.94  However, in order to completely establish the exis-
tence of a partnership, the elements of co-ownership and profit motive are 
required as well.95 
 
85. Id. ¶ 27, 691 N.W.2d at 278. 
86. See id. ¶¶ 13-26, 691 N.W.2d at 275-78 (demonstrating how the elements must be met in 
order to prove a partnership existed). 
87. Ziegler, ¶ 14, 691 N.W.2d at 275. 
88. Id.; UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 202(a) (1997). 
89. Ziegler, ¶ 14, 691 N.W.2d at 275. 




94. Ziegler, ¶ 14, 691 N.W.2d at 275. 
95. Id. ¶¶ 21-26, 691 N.W.2d at 277-78. 
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ii. Co-Ownership 
The second element to prove the existence of a partnership is co-
ownership.96  With co-ownership, parties must prove that they have mutual 
control over their business and that they share a community of interest.97  If 
a party is able to establish mutual control and a community of interest, the 
element of co-ownership is met.98 
With co-ownership, the parties involved must have control over their 
business.99  Parties are considered co-owners of a business when they share 
ultimate control of the enterprise and combine this with profit sharing.100  
While control is necessary to show the existence of co-ownership, relin-
quishing control from the actual parties involved in the co-ownership to as-
sociates is acceptable.101 
Beyond control, parties must also share a community of interest in the 
profits and losses of their business.102  Sharing in the profits of a business is 
essential in partnerships.103  Establishing that the partners share in the losses 
is equally important.104  Showing that parties shared in the profits and 
losses of the business helps establish co-ownership among the parties.105  
Co-ownership is an essential element in determining the existence of a part-
nership.106  Along with co-ownership, though, intent and profit motive must 
also exist.107 
iii. Profit Motive 
The third element to prove the existence of a partnership is profit mo-
tive.108  To meet the profit motive requirement, partners must prove that 
their business is intended to operate for a profit.109  If the parties are able to 
establish that their business was functioning in order to make a profit, the 
element is met.110  Profit motive is an essential element to partnership.111  
 
96. Id. ¶ 21. 
97. Id.  




102. Id. ¶ 24, 691 N.W.2d at 277-78. 
103. Gangl v. Gangl, 281 N.W.2d 574, 580 (N.D. 1979). 
104. Id. at 581. 
105. Id. at 580. 
106. Ziegler, ¶ 21, 691 N.W.2d at 277. 
107. Id. ¶¶ 14-26, 691 N.W.2d at 275-78. 
108. Gangl, 281 N.W.2d at 581. 
109. Id.  
110. Id.; Ziegler, ¶ 26, 691 N.W.2d at 278. 
111. Ziegler, ¶ 26, 691 N.W.2d at 278.  
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But the other essential elements, intent and co-ownership, must be proven 
along with a profit motive to establish a partnership.112 
c. Partnership Standard of Review 
Additionally, the North Dakota Supreme Court has previously held that 
determining whether a partnership exists is a mixed question of law and 
fact.113  However, the final determination, in whether a partnership exists, is 
a question of law.114  In J.P. v. Stark County Social Services Board,115 
which involved Medicaid payments of out-of-state medical care, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court held that questions of law are fully reviewable, that 
is, de novo review applies.116  Furthermore, in Klein v. Larson,117 where 
child custody and child support were at issue, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court held that when there are questions of fact, the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review applies.118 
While partnership law and joint venture law are not identical, they 
share many similarities, likely because at one time they were indistinguish-
able.119  Partnership law has been very influential in the development of 
joint venture law.120  Although similar, partnerships and joint ventures are 
distinct entities with varying components.121 
B. A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF JOINT VENTURES 
Joint venture relationships are similar to partnerships, but more limited 
in scope and duration.122  Understanding common concepts of general joint 
venture law, as well as specific interpretations of joint venture law by 
states, is important in obtaining a grasp of joint venture law.123  The follow-
 
112. Id. ¶¶ 14-24, 691 N.W.2d at 275-78. 
113. Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky, 2003 ND 110, ¶ 7, 666 N.W.2d 444, 446.  Mixed questions of 
law and fact involve issues that are neither pure questions of fact nor pure questions of law.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1024 (8th ed. 2004).  Questions of fact do not involve the law on a 
given point; instead, they are required to be resolved by a jury in a jury trial or judge in a bench 
trial. Id. at 1281.  Questions of law concern the application or interpretation of the law and are 
answered by the judge. Id. 
114. Tarnavsky, ¶ 7, 666 N.W.2d at 446. 
115. 2007 ND 140, 737 N.W.2d 627. 
116. J.P., ¶ 9, 737 N.W.2d at 631. 
117. 2006 ND 236, 724 N.W.2d 565. 
118. Klein, ¶ 35, 724 N.W.2d at 575. 
119. Henry W. Nichols, Joint Ventures, 36 VA. L. REV. 425, 428 (1950). 
120. See SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d 580, 582 (stating 
that partnership law principles apply to joint ventures). 
121. Nichols, supra note 119, at 444. 
122. SPW Assocs., LLP, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d at 582. 
123. See Nichols, supra note 119, at 432-33 (describing the common characteristics of joint 
venture relationships). 
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ing sections explain both the general concepts of joint venture law and the 
North Dakota Supreme Court’s interpretation of joint venture law.  First, 
joint venture relationships are broadly discussed.  Next, joint venture rela-
tionships are discussed in the context of North Dakota law. 
1. Overview of Joint Venture Law 
At common law, joint ventures, a creation of the American court sys-
tem, were not recognized as an individual entity.124  Instead, they were 
identified as informal partnerships.125  While no identified reason of why or 
how joint ventures developed, American courts began to recognize joint 
ventures and distinguish them from partnerships as early as 1890.126  It was 
then that courts began to gradually acknowledge that parties could combine 
their property and services without forming an actual partnership.127 
Joint venture relationships are typically described as similar to partner-
ships, without the longevity of a partnership:  “[t]he joint venture, also 
known as joint adventure, joint enterprise, joint undertaking, joint specula-
tion and syndicate, has been defined as a special combination of two or 
more persons who, in some specific venture, seek a profit jointly without 
any actual partnership or corporate designation.”128  Courts have generally 
stated that joint venture relationships are established when parties undertake 
a specific business project with a profit motive.129  Additionally, the parties 
involved must have an equal voice regarding the control and management 
of the venture.130 
No exclusive test is used to establish a joint venture.131  Whether a joint 
venture exists depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, as no 
rule can be applied to every case.132  In joint venture relationships, a single 
factor is not determinative.133  Instead, the facts of each case are examined 
as a whole.134  However, courts have determined a number of elements that 
generally establish a joint venture:  (1) two or more parties must establish a 
specific agreement to carry on a venture; (2) parties must show through the 
agreement an intention to be joint venturers; (3) parties must each 
 
124. Nichols, supra note 119, at 428. 
125. See id. (explaining the history of joint venture entities). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 430. 
129. Id. at 431. 
130. Id.  
131. Id. at 432. 
132. Id. at 433. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
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contribute property, finances, skill, knowledge, or effort to the joint 
venture; (4) parties must each have some control over the enterprise; and (5) 
parties must share in both the profits and the losses of the enterprise.135 
2. North Dakota Joint Venture Law 
The North Dakota Supreme Court more clearly defines the nature of 
joint ventures in North Dakota.136  The court’s interpretation of joint ven-
ture law will be developed throughout the following sections.  First, the 
definition of a joint venture is discussed.  Then the elements of a joint ven-
ture are analyzed.  Finally, the standard of review for joint ventures is 
examined. 
a. Definition of a Joint Venture 
Historically, North Dakota has recognized joint venture relation-
ships.137  In SPW Associates, LLP v. Anderson,138 the North Dakota Sup-
reme Court stated that joint ventures are very similar to partnerships, but 
more limited in scope and duration.139  Additionally, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court has stated there is no definite way to determine the 
existence of a joint venture.140  While each case depends on its respective 
facts, the North Dakota Supreme Court has indicated that particular 
elements are very influential when establishing a joint venture.141  
Consequently, understanding the factors relied upon by the North Dakota 
Supreme Court provides crucial insights into the determination of a joint 
venture relationship.142 
b. Elements of a Joint Venture 
In Voltz v. Dudgeon,143 James Dudgeon appealed from a judgment for 
Jeffrey Voltz.144  In 1978, Voltz, a farmer, purchased a truck through his 
business, Voltz Trucking, in order to haul grain.145  Voltz hired Dudgeon to 
 
135. Id. 
136. See SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d 580, 582 (explain-
ing the North Dakota Supreme Court’s interpretation of joint ventures). 
137. See, e.g., SPW Assocs., LLP, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d at 582 (“North Dakota has historically 
recognized the joint venture relationship.”). 
138. 2006 ND 159, 718 N.W.2d 580. 
139. SPW Assocs., LLP,  ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d at 582. 
140. Id. ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d at 583; Voltz v. Dudgeon, 334 N.W.2d 204, 206 (N.D. 1983). 
141. SPW Assocs., LLP,  ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d at 583; Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 206. 
142. See Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 206 (defining the elements of a joint venture). 
143. 334 N.W.2d 204 (N.D. 1983). 
144. Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 205. 
145. Id. 
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transport the grain and the two later decided that they could make more 
money with an additional truck.146  Voltz Trucking purchased another truck, 
and both Voltz and Dudgeon signed the purchase agreement.147  Dudgeon 
maintained the second truck and oversaw the bills for the truck mainten-
ance.148  Dudgeon was also authorized to write checks and even withdraw 
his compensation from the account.149  After Voltz Trucking purchased the 
second truck, the first truck was in an accident and was not operable, which 
left Voltz Trucking with only one truck.150  But after a discrepancy regard-
ing the serial numbers of the second truck, the truck had to be returned to 
the seller, leaving Voltz Trucking with no trucks.151  Voltz brought an ac-
tion against Dudgeon.152  He claimed that because of the partnership be-
tween the two men, Dudgeon was responsible for half of the trucking busi-
ness expenses.153  The district court found that a joint venture, not a 
partnership, existed between the parties.154  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision.155 
The Voltz court elaborated on the elements of the long-recognized joint 
venture relationship.156  Because the court had never specifically defined 
the elements needed to show a joint venture relationship, it summarized 
elements that the Minnesota Supreme Court used in what was considered a 
generally accepted rule.157  The court provided four elements that it found 
necessary to establish a joint venture relationship:  (1) contribution; (2) joint 
proprietorship and control; (3) sharing of profits, but not necessarily losses; 
and (4) a contract.158  The court also held that a business enterprise must be 
limited in scope and duration in order to be considered a joint venture.159 
In SPW Associates, LLP v. Anderson, Murdo Cameron appealed from a 
district court judgment that determined SPW Associates had lawfully 












156. Id. at 206. 
157. Id. (citing Rehnberg v. Minnesota Homes, 52 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Minn. 1952)). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 1, 718 N.W.2d 580, 581. 
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vintage airplane.161  After Cameron placed advertisements in aviation 
magazines, Douglas Anderson responded.162  The two men entered into a 
written agreement to build two airplanes.163  Cameron was responsible for 
providing an engine for the first airplane and parts for both airplanes, while 
Anderson was in charge of designing and manufacturing different parts for 
the airplanes.164  Cameron and Anderson agreed that they would each keep 
one of the completed airplanes.165 
Anderson later entered into a loan agreement with SPW Associates 
through his company, Exclusive Aviation, in order to finance the air-
planes.166  Anderson defaulted on the loan and signed an agreement grant-
ing possession of the first airplane to SPW Associates.167  Cameron filed a 
lien multiple times, and eventually the lien was recorded.168  SPW Asso-
ciates then sought a declaratory judgment stating that it was entitled to pos-
session of the airplane.169  Cameron argued that his interest in the airplane, 
not the security interest of SPW Associates, was superior.170  The district 
court found that Anderson and Cameron formed a joint venture relation-
ship.171  Due to this relationship, the district court granted SPW Associates 
the security interest in the airplane.172  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed.173 
The North Dakota Supreme Court reiterated the elements necessary to 
establish a joint venture relationship.174  The court held that four elements 
were necessary to show a joint venture relationship.175  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court, however, also clarified that no definite formula exists for 
identifying a joint venture relationship and the facts of each case control the 
decision.176 
 
161. Id. ¶ 2. 
162. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
163. Id. ¶ 3, 718 N.W.2d at 581. 
164. Id. at 581-82. 
165. Id. at 582. 
166. Id. ¶ 4. 
167. Id. ¶ 5. 
168. Id. 




173. Id. ¶ 14, 718 N.W.2d at 584. 
174. Id. ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d at 583. The court laid out four elements:  (1) contribution by the 
parties; (2) proprietary interest and right of mutual control; (3) an express or implied agreement 
for the sharing of profits, but not necessarily losses; and (4) an express or implied contract show-
ing the formation of a joint venture. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
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While the court established that the facts of each particular case are 
important, the court also established that certain elements need to be present 
for a joint venture relationship to exist.177  The following sections explain 
each of the elements essential to establish a joint venture in North Dakota.  
First, contribution is analyzed.  Next, the requirement of a proprietary 
interest and mutual control are discussed.  Then, the express or implied 
agreement for the sharing of profits is examined.  Finally, the express or 
implied contract is explored. 
i. Contribution 
When establishing that a joint venture relationship existed, parties must 
prove contribution among the members of the venture.178  Contribution 
shows that the parties involved in the joint venture relationship combined 
their money, property, time, or skill.179  In Voltz v. Dudgeon, both parties 
contributed, but in different ways.180  While Voltz contributed money to the 
venture, Dudgeon contributed his time, skill, knowledge, driving expertise, 
and business maintenance.181  Therefore, while parties involved in a joint 
venture relationship must show that they each contributed in some way, the 
contribution that each party supplied does not necessarily need to be of 
equal type or value, as long as all of the parties have contributed.182  Like 
the element of contribution, establishing a proprietary interest and mutual 
control, an agreement for shared profits, and a contract showing the agree-
ment are also essential elements.183 
ii. Proprietary Interest and Mutual Control 
To establish that a joint venture relationship exists, parties must also 
show that a proprietary interest and right of mutual control existed over the 
joint venture property.184  A proprietary interest is defined as “the interest 
held by a property owner together with all appurtenant rights, such as a 
 
177. See generally id. (listing the elements after stating “the following four elements must be 
present”); Voltz v. Dudgeon, 334 N.W.2d 204, 206 (N.D. 1983) (defining the elements necessary 
to prove a joint venture relationship). 
178. See Voltz v. Dudgeon 334 N.W.2d 204, 206 (N.D. 1983) (defining the meaning of 






184. See id. (listing and defining elements necessary to display a North Dakota joint ven-
ture); see also SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d 580, 583 (listing 
the elements necessary to display a North Dakota joint venture). 
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stockholder’s right to vote the shares.”185  Sharing an economic interest is 
an important part in proving a joint venture; however, an economic interest 
alone is not sufficient to prove a joint venture.186  Parties must also demon-
strate joint control over the venture.187  Once a party has demonstrated that 
they had some control in the enterprise, the element of proprietary interest 
and mutual control is met.188  Beyond the other required elements, an agree-
ment for shared profits must also be shown to form a joint venture.189 
iii. Agreement for Shared Profits 
Parties must prove an express or implied agreement, showing that they 
intended to share in the profits of the venture.190  The agreement, however, 
does not necessarily need to show that the parties intended to share in the 
losses of the venture.191  In Voltz v. Dudgeon, no express agreement demon-
strated that the parties intended to share in the profits of the trucking 
business.192  Dudgeon, however, testified that he expected to share in the 
profits.193  Therefore, the court found that although no express agreement 
existed, an implied agreement to share in the profits of the business was 
present.194  Similarly, in SPW Associates, LLP, the parties did not have an 
express agreement to share in the profits of making airplanes.195  However, 
because the parties had an agreement to build airplanes and sell them to 
third parties, the court found that the parties implied, through their actions 
and other agreements, to share in the profits of the venture.196  An agree-
ment to share in profits is essential in establishing a joint venture.197  The 
existence of a contract that can show the formation of a joint venture is also 
a critical element in the formation of a joint venture.198 
 
185. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 829 (8th ed. 2004). 
186. See Nichols, supra note 119, at 439 (stating that the joint venturers typically need to 
have an equal voice and level of control); see also 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 13 (2006) 
(stating that merely sharing an economic interest is not sufficient to form a joint venture). 




191. See id. (explaining an agreement for shared profits); see SPW Assocs., LLP v. 
Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d 580, 583. 
192. Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 205. 
193. Id. at 207.  
194. Id. 
195. SPW Assocs., LLP, ¶ 11, 718 N.W.2d at 583. 
196. Id. ¶ 12, 718 N.W.2d at 584. 
197. Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 206. 
198. Id. 
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iv. Contract Showing Joint Venture 
To establish a joint venture relationship, parties must show an express 
or implied contract to form a joint venture relationship.199  Similar to the 
agreement to share profits, the contract that shows that the parties entered 
into a joint venture can be either express or implied.200  In Voltz, Dudgeon 
argued that there was no contract between the parties even though he had 
co-signed a retail installment contract.201  The court, however, held that the 
circumstances of the events “indicate[d] a sufficient objective manifestation 
of consent” which, in turn, satisfied the implied contract element.202  When 
a contract showing the formation of a joint venture is present, along with 
evidence of contribution, proprietary interest and mutual control, and an 
agreement to share in profits, all of the elements of a joint venture are 
met.203 
c. Joint Venture Standard of Review 
Determining the existence of a joint venture is a question of fact.204  
The North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure state, “[f]indings of fact . . . 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses.”205  The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that a finding 
of fact is clearly erroneous if:  (1) induced by an erroneous view of the law; 
(2) no evidence supports the finding; or (3) the reviewing court is left with a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.206 
While differences exist between partnerships and joint ventures, such 
as their respective standards of review, they also share many similar 
qualities.207  For instance, the fiduciary duties that partners and joint 
venturers owe to one another are identical.208  Throughout the next section, 
these fiduciary duties owed in partnerships and joint ventures are analyzed. 
 
199. See id. (defining the elements needed to show a joint venture relationship in North Da-
kota); SPW Assocs., LLP, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d at 583 (listing the elements needed to show a joint 
venture relationship in North Dakota). 
200. Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 206; SPW Assocs., LLP, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d at 583. 
201. Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 207. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 206. 
204. Id. 
205. N.D. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
206. Klein v. Larson, 2006 ND 236, ¶ 6, 724 N.W.2d 565, 567. 
207. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (explaining that partners 
and joint venturers owe one another the same fiduciary duties). 
208. Id. 
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C. FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN PARTNERSHIPS AND JOINT VENTURES 
A fiduciary relationship exists when a person is expected to act for the 
benefit of another person, in the scope of their relationship.209  Section one 
will discuss a background of case law regarding partnership and joint ven-
ture fiduciary duties.  Section two will then examine the general concepts of 
the fiduciary duties for partnerships and joint ventures. 
1. Case Law Regarding Fiduciary Duties 
Partners are bound to strict fiduciary duties regarding loyalty and 
care.210  Partnership law applies to joint venture relationships.211  Therefore, 
joint venture relationships are bound by the same strict fiduciary duties re-
garding loyalty and care as partnerships.212  The following sections illu-
strate the great responsibility courts have placed on parties with regard to 
fiduciary duties. 
a. General Fiduciary Duty Case Law 
In the seminal fiduciary duty case, Meinhard v. Salmon,213 Walter 
Salmon leased the Hotel Bristol for twenty years from Louisa Gerry.214  
Salmon intended to renovate the building and develop shops and offices at a 
cost of $200,000.215  Salmon worked with Morton Meinhard, who provided 
funding for the renovations.216  The Court of Appeals of New York con-
sidered the relationship between Salmon and Meinhard to be a joint 
venture.217 
Near the end of the twenty-year lease, Elbridge Gerry became the new 
owner of the premises.218  In addition to Hotel Bristol, Gerry owned a 
number of buildings in the same area.219  Gerry intended to lease the area 
long-term to someone who would destroy and replace the buildings.220  
Eventually, Gerry leased the area to Midpoint Realty Company, a company 
 
209. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1315 (8th ed. 2004). 
210. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404 (1997) (discussing the fiduciary duties owed in 
partnership relationships); N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-16-04 (2007) (describing the fiduciary duties 
owed in partnership relationships). 
211. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
212. Id. 
213. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
214. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 545. 
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controlled by Salmon.221  Salmon did not inform Meinhard of the lease until 
it was finalized, which was approximately one month after the signing and 
delivery of the lease.222  Meinhard then demanded that the lease be included 
in the joint venture’s assets, which would oblige Salmon to share in the 
interest of the lease.223  Salmon refused, and a referee then found in favor of 
Meinhard, but limited Meinhard’s interest in the lease to twenty-five 
percent.224  In a cross-appeal at the appellate division, the court increased 
Meinhard’s interest to fifty percent.225  Salmon appealed.226 
The New York Court of Appeals held that joint venturers are subject to 
the same strict fiduciary duties as partners: 
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the 
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty.  Many forms of 
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s 
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee is 
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.  Not 
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior.  As to this there has developed a 
tradition that is unbending and inveterate.  Uncompromising rigid-
ity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to un-
dermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating ero-
sion” of particular exceptions.  Only thus has the level of conduct 
for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the 
crowd.  It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this 
court.227 
The court found that Salmon excluded Meinhard from the chance to 
compete when he chose to keep the new lease a secret.228  While the New 
York Court of Appeals held that Salmon was not guilty of a conscious 
purpose to defraud, the New York Court of Appeals found that Salmon was 
in a position to gain the new lease because of the success of his joint 
venture with Meinhard.229  Consequently, the New York Court of Appeals 









228. Id. at 547. 
229. Id. at 548. 
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designate certain proceeds that Salmon gained from entering the lease to go 
to Meinhard.230 
Meinard has had a large impact on fiduciary duties owed in both part-
nership and joint venture relationships.231  Not only did the case demon-
strate that a great expectation for loyalty and care exists in joint venture re-
lationships, but it also heightened the level of loyalty and care due in 
partnership relationships.232  The court’s words describing the strictness of 
fiduciary duties have been quoted both in cases involving partnerships and 
joint ventures.233  Many courts, including the North Dakota Supreme Court, 
use Meinhard to fully explain the high standard set, in regard to fiduciary 
duties.234 
b. North Dakota Fiduciary Duty Case Law 
In Svihl v. Gress,235 Albert Svihl alleged that he and George Gress en-
tered into a partnership relationship in order to transport livestock.236  Svihl 
claimed that Gress disposed of assets and demanded an accounting for all of 
the money and property received by the partnership.237  The district court 
held that a partnership existed between Svihl and Gress, and that Svihl was 
not entitled to a share of the rental profits for a cattle trailer, which Svihl as-
serted belonged to the partnership.238  Svihl appealed and claimed that the 
district court erred when it held that Svihl was not entitled to a share of the 
rent on a partnership-owned cattle trailer.239  Svihl and Gress previously 
agreed that no business profits would be disbursed until the partnership paid 
off its debts.240  The partnership owed money for the machinery used to 
operate the business, and it also owed Gress for the money he advanced in 
order to operate the business.241  The North Dakota Supreme Court held that 
 
230. Id. at 549. 
231. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 259 (stating that the decision is applicable to both 
partnerships and joint ventures). 
232. See id. (explaining the importance of the decision in Meinhard). 
233. See generally Svihl v. Gress, 216 N.W.2d 110, 115 (N.D. 1974) (quoting Judge Car-
dozo’s words regarding fiduciary duties in Meinhard). 
234. See, e.g., Svihl, 216 N.W.2d at 115 (using Judge Cardozo’s Meinhard decision to illu-
strate the fiduciary duties owed to partners and joint venturers). 
235. 216 N.W.2d 110 (N.D. 1974).  
236. Svihl, 216 N.W.2d at 111. 
237. Id. 
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Svihl was entitled to rental profits from the cattle trailer, but only after 
Gress had been fully compensated for his advance to the business.242 
The North Dakota Supreme Court used Meinhard to demonstrate the 
importance of fiduciary duties in a partnership relationship.243  The court 
held that the fiduciary duties, with regard to partnership assets, were 
significant, because those who choose to enter into a fiduciary relationship 
must be held to a higher standard in regard to their partnership 
relationships.244  The court also held that partners owe one another the 
duties of good faith and integrity in their partnership dealings.245 
2. General Concepts of Fiduciary Duties 
Partners owe the partnership and their partners the fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and care.246  The duties cannot be removed through a partnership 
agreement.247  However, the partnership agreement may determine how the 
partnership plans to measure the performance of the duties, so long as the 
determination is not unreasonable.248 
In Grynberg v. Dome Petroleum Corp.,249 a case that involved a 
farmout agreement and fiduciary duties, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
stated “[t]he existence and scope of a fiduciary duty depends upon the 
language of the parties’ agreement.”250  The UPA states fiduciary duties 
that are relevant in partnership relationships.251  The North Dakota Century 
Code uses the same language in identifying the fiduciary duties of a 
partnership.252  While these laws are discussed in the context of partnership 
relationships, remembering that the principles of partnership laws apply to 
joint venture relationships is important.253  In the following section, the 
duty of loyalty owed in a partnership relationship is discussed.  Finally, the 
duty of care owed in a partnership relationship is examined. 
 
242. Id. at 120. 
243. Id. at 115 (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)). 
244. Id. 
245. Id. (citing Engstrom v. Larson, 55 N.W.2d 579, 587 (N.D. 1952)). 
246. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(a) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-16-04(1) (2007). 
247. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b)(3), (4) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-13-
03(2)(c-d) (2007); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 1 (1997). 
248. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b)(3)(i)-(ii) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-13-
03(2)(c) (2007); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 1 (1997). 
249. 1999 ND 167, 599 N.W.2d 261. 
250. Grynberg, ¶ 21, 599 N.W.2d at 267. 
251. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404 (1997); see also § 45-16-04 (showing North Da-
kota’s language in regard to fiduciary duties). 
252. See § 45-16-04 (displaying identical language regarding partnerships). 
253. See SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d 580, 582 (explain-
ing how the principles of partnership law apply to joint ventures). 
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a. Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty is essential in a partnership relationship.254  The 
purpose of the duty of loyalty is to prevent individual partners from profit-
ing at the expense of the partnership.255  UPA section 404(b) outlines the 
areas of partnerships where a duty of loyalty is owed: 
A partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners 
is limited to the following: 
1. to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any 
property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the 
conduct and winding up of the partnership business or de-
rived from a use by the partner or partnership property, 
including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity; 
2. to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the con-
duct or winding up of the partnership business as or on 
behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partner-
ship; and 
3. to refrain from competing with the partnership in the con-
duct of the partnership business before the dissolution of 
the partnership.256 
These three areas encompass the entire duty of loyalty that is owed in a 
partnership relationship.257 
UPA section 404(b)(1) discusses the duty of loyalty in the context of 
business opportunities.258  The provision limits the duty of loyalty in two 
ways.259  First, the section requires that the partners involved in a partner-
ship avoid any opportunities, without consent from the other partners, 
which would allow them to use the partnership property for their own per-
sonal gain.260  Second, the provision requires individual partners to avoid 
taking business opportunities from which the partnership may benefit.261  
But the second section of the provision may be eliminated if all of the part-
ners agree.262  Additionally, if an opportunity arises and the partnership 
 
254. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 1. 
255. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 261. 
256. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(b); see also § 45-16-04(2) (noting the identical lan-
guage present in the UPA). 
257. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 2. 
258. Id. § 404(b)(1) (1997); see also § 45-16-04(2)(a) (showing the corresponding section of 
North Dakota partnership law). 
259. Id. § 404(b)(1) (1997); see also § 45-16-04(2)(a). 
260. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 263. 
261. Id. at 262. 
262. Id. at 263. 
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wholly decides to pass, the individual partners may then take the opportun-
ities for themselves.263 
UPA section 404(b)(2) prevents partners from operating as, or on 
behalf of, a party that has an adverse interest to the partnership.264  A 
conflict of interest exists when a partner has agreed to allow the partnership 
to participate in business with a partner, a partner’s family member, an 
organization in which the partner has financial interest, or any person whose 
interests are adverse to the partnership.265  These relationships lead to a 
conflict of interest, which is considered a breach of the duty of loyalty.266 
UPA section 404(b)(3) requires partners to avoid competing with the 
partnership before the dissolution of the partnership.267  As soon as the part-
nership dissolution occurs, the individual partners may again compete.268  
However, the partners are not able to use confidential information gained 
from the partnership after the dissolution.269 
To remedy violations of UPA section 404(b), the partners who 
breached the provision are required to reimburse the partnership.270  If a 
partner violates UPA section 404(b), he or she is required to give any prof-
its gained through his or her violation to the partnership.271  While a 
partnership is not required to prove damages in these cases, if the 
partnership can, it may then bring an additional suit to compensate those 
damages.272  This duty of loyalty, as well as a duty of care, is owed to part-
ners in partner relationships.273 
b. Duty of Care 
The duty of care among partners is limited to “refraining from engag-
ing in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a 
knowing violation of law.”274  In explaining the duty of care, comment 
three to UPA section 404 states, “[t]he standard of care imposed by RUPA 
is that of gross negligence.”275  While partners have a duty to avoid gross 
 
263. Id. 
264. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 2 (1997). 
265. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 263. 
266. Id. at 264. 
267. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(b)(3); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-16-04(2)(c) 
(2007) (articulating North Dakota’s fiduciary requirement of partners). 
268. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 2. 
269. Id. 
270. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 264. 
271. Id. at 261. 
272. Id. at 264. 
273. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 3. 
274. N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-16-04(3) (2007). 
275. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 3. 
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negligence, partners are not liable to the partnership for common mis-
takes.276  Under the revised UPA, the duty of care cannot be eliminated 
from a partnership.277  While the standard of care can be limited, the stan-
dard cannot be “unreasonably reduce[d].”278 
Fiduciary duties play a large role in both partnership and joint venture 
relationships.279  As partnership law applies to joint ventures, joint 
venturers are bound to the same stringent fiduciary duties as partners.280  
Therefore, partners and joint venturers should be aware of the possible 
liabilities they will face if fiduciary duties are breached.281 
D. TOP LEASES 
A top lease is an oil and gas lease.282  In Reynolds-Rexwinkle Oil, Inc. 
v. Petex, Inc.,283 which involved oil and gas lease extensions, the Kansas 
Supreme Court cited Williams and Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms, 
to define “top lease” as “an oil and gas lease granted by a landowner during 
the existence of a recorded mineral lease which is to become effective if 
and when the existing lease expires or is terminated.”284  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court has also applied this definition when explaining top 
leases.285 
In Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co.,286 the North Dakota Supreme Court 
discussed top leasing.287  The court stated that while top leasing was once 
discouraged and considered to be similar to claim jumping, it is now 
considered useful.288  Top leasing is now seen as functional because a top 
lease increases drilling and competitiveness among oil lessees.289  If a 
current lease, also known as a bottom lease, is topped, the owner of the 
bottom lease will likely drill on the land in order to prevent losing the 
 
276. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 258. 
277. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b)(4); § 404, cmt. 3. 
278. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b)(4).   
279. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
280. Id. 
281. See id. (discussing the importance of fiduciary duties in both partnerships and joint 
ventures). 
282. Reynolds-Rexwinkle Oil, Inc. v. Petex, Inc., 1 P.3d 909, 914 (Kan. 2000). 
283. 1 P.3d 909 (Kan. 2000). 
284. Reynolds-Rexwinkle Oil, Inc., 1 P.3d at 914. 
285. Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d 655, 657 n.1 (N.D. 1986). 
286. 382 N.W.2d 655 (N.D. 1986). 
287. Nantt, 382 N.W.2d at 659. 
288. Id. 
289. Nelson Roach, The Rule Against Perpetuities: The Validity of Oil and Gas Top Leases 
and Top Deeds in Texas After Peveto v. Starkey, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 399, 409 (1983). 
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lease.290  Additionally, top leasing allows smaller oil companies to compete 
with larger oil companies in heavily leased areas.291  Therefore, top leasing 
plays a large role in the development of areas with an abundance of oil.292 
The North Dakota Supreme Court, along with many other courts, has 
examined top leases, as well as partnership and joint venture relation-
ships.293  With partnership and joint venture relationships, the court has 
established specific elements that are essential in showing the formation of 
each entity.294  Additionally, courts have determined the fiduciary duties for 
both of these relationships and discussed the heightened responsibility of 
loyalty and care that partners and joint venturers owe to one another.295  
The North Dakota Supreme Court used its past decisions regarding partner-
ships, joint ventures, fiduciary duties, and top leases to decide Sandvick v. 
Lacrosse in 2008.296 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Sandvick v. LaCrosse, Justice Sandstrom wrote the majority opinion, 
joined by Chief Justice VandeWalle and Justice Maring.297  The Honorable 
Bruce E. Bohlman, who sat in place of Justice Kapsner, also joined the 
majority.298  Justice Crothers concurred in part and dissented in part.299  In 
reversing the district court’s decision, the majority found that a joint ven-
ture relationship existed between the parties, but that a partnership relation-
ship did not.300  Additionally, the majority held that Haughton and La-
Crosse owed Bragg and Sandvick damages because Haughton and 
LaCrosse breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty.301  The dissent agreed 
with the majority that a partnership did not exist, but dissented as to the 




292. See id. (discussing top leasing). 
293. See Gangl v. Gangl, 281 N.W.2d 574, 579 (N.D. 1979) (defining partnership under the 
North Dakota Century Code); see also SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 8, 718 
N.W.2d 580, 582 (defining joint venture). 
294. See, e.g., Ziegler v. Dahl, 2005 ND 10, ¶¶ 13-26, 691 N.W.2d 271, 275-78 (identifying 
and explaining the elements of a North Dakota partnership); Voltz v. Dudgeon, 334 N.W.2d 204, 
206 (N.D. 1983) (defining the elements of a joint venture). 
295. E.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
296. See discussion infra Part III (analyzing Sandvick).  
297. Sandvick v. LaCrosse, 2008 ND 77, ¶¶ 1, 22, 747N.W.2d 519, 520, 524. 
298. Id. ¶ 23, 747 N.W.2d at 524. 
299. Id. (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
300. Id. ¶¶ 10, 13, 747 N.W.2d at 522, 523. 
301. Id. ¶¶ 19, 20, 747 N.W.2d at 524. 
302. Id. ¶ 24 (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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A. MAJORITY OPINION 
The majority first discussed how to establish a partnership, and then 
determined that one did not exist between Bragg, Haughton, LaCrosse, and 
Sandvick.303  The majority then analyzed joint venture relationships and 
held that one did exist between the parties.304  Finally, the majority dis-
cussed the fiduciary duties of joint venturers and found that Haughton and 
LaCrosse breached their duties of loyalty and care.305  With regard to the 
breach of fiduciary duties, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that 
Haughton and LaCrosse owed damages to Bragg and Sandvick.306 
1. Determination of Partnership 
First, the North Dakota Supreme Court analyzed what constituted a 
partnership under North Dakota law.307  The court referenced Tarnavsky 
and held that the elements of a partnership are:  (1) the intention to be part-
ners; (2) co-ownership of the business; and (3) a profit motive.308  The court 
then discussed the standard of review that should be used to determine the 
existence of partnerships.309  The court quoted Tarnavsky and stated that the 
existence of a partnership is a mixed question of law and fact.310  Ulti-
mately, the court stated that existence of a partnership is a question of law, 
and that questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal.311 
The court then discussed the district court’s decision.312  The district 
court held that the parties did not co-own a business.313  Also, the district 
court determined that the business the parties were involved in was limited 
because their relationship was confined to their involvement in the Horn 
Leases.314  Furthermore, the district court found that the Horn Leases were 
only for a set period of time, and therefore were limited to that specific time 
period.315 
 
303. Id. ¶¶ 7-10, 747 N.W.2d at 521-22. 
304. Id. ¶¶ 11-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23. 
305. Id. ¶¶ 14-19, 747 N.W.2d at 523-24. 
306. Id. ¶ 20, 747 N.W.2d at 524. 
307. Id. ¶¶ 7-10, 747 N.W.2d at 521-22. 
308. Id. ¶ 7, 747 N.W.2d at 521 (citing Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky, 2003 ND 110, ¶ 7, 666 
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Next, the Sandvick court discussed the revised UPA and its history in 
North Dakota.316  The court stated that it has the option to examine com-
ments of the revised UPA, which North Dakota adopted in 1995, in order to 
interpret the intent of the drafters.317  Therefore, when a conflict or 
misinterpretation occurs, the court has the ability to review the comments 
and understand the intent of the statutory language.318 
Finally, the court analyzed the facts of the case in order to determine if 
a partnership existed.319  The court discussed that the parties entered the 
leases for a specific amount of time, that they intended to sell the leases, 
and that the parties were involved in numerous similar enterprises with dif-
ferent parties.320  These factors proved influential and displayed that they 
did not intend to be involved with one another by means of a partnership.321  
The Sandvick court concluded that the district court did not err, and that no 
partnership existed between the parties, because the Horn Leases consti-
tuted one act, not a series of acts.322 
2. Determination of Joint Venture 
The North Dakota Supreme Court then analyzed what constituted a 
joint venture in North Dakota.323  The court stated that joint venture 
relationships are similar to partnerships, but are more limited in scope and 
duration.324  The court also acknowledged that the laws of partnerships ap-
ply to joint ventures.325  The court laid out the four elements needed to 
show that a joint venture exists:  (1) contribution; (2) proprietary interest 
and the right of mutual control; (3) an express or implied agreement for 
sharing of profits, but not necessarily losses; and (4) an express or implied 
contract showing the formation of a joint venture.326  However, the court 
also stated that there is not a set method to determine the existence of a joint 
venture, as each case is dependent on the facts.327 
 
316. Id. ¶ 9 (citing Ziegler v. Dahl, 2005 ND 10, ¶ 14, 691 N.W.2d 271, 275). 
317. Id. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. ¶ 10, 747 N.W.2d at 521-22. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. at 522. 
322. Id.  
323. Id. ¶¶ 11-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23 (citing SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 
159, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d 580, 582). 
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After the court discussed the background of joint ventures in North 
Dakota, it reviewed the district court findings regarding the existence of a 
joint venture.328  The district court held that a joint venture did not exist.329  
The district court also found that an agreement between Bragg and Haugh-
ton or LaCrosse about the purchase of future leases did not exist.330  
Additionally, no written or oral agreement was found between Sandvick 
and Haughton or LaCrosse concerning a new lease.331  Furthermore, when 
the Horn Leases were purchased, no agreement between Bragg and 
Haughton or LaCrosse about the lease development existed.332  In fact, no 
agreement was shown that made Bragg or Sandvick a part of any future 
leases.333  No agreement was established between the parties that limited 
them in any way, with regard to other similar projects.334  Beyond that, 
none of the parties involved in the Horn Leases intended to work exclu-
sively with one another, a fact well-known among those involved.335  Fi-
nally, none of the individuals involved expected that the others would in-
clude them in their other business projects.336 
The Sandvick court also discussed some of the other findings made by 
the district court.337  The district court found that the parties had a checking 
account entitled “Empire Oil JV Account,” that the leases were purchased 
from their equal contributions, that the leases’ title was held under the 
Empire Oil Company’s name, and that the parties intended to sell the 
leases.338  These findings, along with the testimony of Bragg, Haughton, 
and LaCrosse that stated the parties intended to share in the profits, 
persuaded the North Dakota Supreme Court to determine that a joint 
venture existed between the parties.339 
 









337. Id. ¶ 13, 747 N.W.2d at 523. 
338. Id. 
339. Id. 
        
2009] CASE COMMENT 497 
 
3. Determination of Fiduciary Duties 
Finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court analyzed the fiduciary duties 
required in joint venture relationships in North Dakota.340  The court stated 
that fiduciary duties can be owed in different ways, depending on the 
agreement between the parties.341  The court also held that partnership law 
is applicable to joint ventures.342 
The North Dakota Supreme Court looked to the North Dakota Century 
Code, which states that partners owe one another the duty of loyalty and 
care.343  The court described the duty of loyalty by using the North Dakota 
Century Code and previous court decisions, such as Meinhard and Svihl.344  
The Sandvick court then discussed the purchase of the original Horn Leases 
in comparison to the purchase of the Horn Top Leases.345  The court deter-
mined that an important difference between the two purchases was the fact 
that Bragg and Sandvick were unaware of Haughton and LaCrosse’s at-
tainment of the Horn Top Leases.346  The court found that Haughton and 
LaCrosse created a conflict of interest when they purchased the Horn Top 
Leases without informing Bragg and Sandvick of the purchase.347 
Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that purchasing the 
Horn Top Leases was not in the best interest of the joint venture because of 
the underlying joint venture in the original Horn Leases.348 The court 
reasoned that because Bragg and Sandvick were deliberately left out of the 
attainment of the Horn Top Leases, Haughton and LaCrosse breached their 
fiduciary duties of loyalty.349  The Sandvick court remanded the case in 
order to determine the amount of damages that Bragg and Sandvick should 
receive.350  The court further instructed the district court to limit damages to 
the revenue generated from oil production on the land where the Horn 
leases existed.351  While the court found that a joint venture existed between 
 
340. Id. ¶¶ 14-19, 747 N.W.2d at 523-24. 
341. Id. ¶ 14, 747 N.W.2d at 523 (citing Grynberg v. Dome Petroleum Corp., 1999 ND 167, 
¶ 21, 599 N.W.2d 261, 267). 
342. Id. (citing SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d 580, 582). 
343. Id. ¶ 15 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-16-04(1) (2007)). 
344. Id. ¶ 16 (citing Svihl v. Gress, 216 N.W.2d 110, 115 (N.D. 1974); Meinhard v. Salmon, 
164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)). 
345. Id. ¶ 17, 747 N.W.2d at 523-24. 
346. Id. at 524. 
347. Id. ¶ 19. 
348. Id. 
349. Id. (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928)). 
350. Id. ¶ 20. 
351. Id. 
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Bragg, Haughton, LaCrosse, and Sandvick and that Haughton and LaCrosse 
breached the fiduciary duties that they owed to Bragg and Sandvick, Justice 
Crothers dissented in regard to these specific holdings.352 
B. JUSTICE CROTHERS’S CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION 
Justice Crothers concurred in part and dissented in part from the ma-
jority opinion.353  Justice Crothers’ concurred with the majority’s holding 
that a partnership did not exist in this case.354  Justice Crothers’s dissent dis-
cussed the process of finding a joint venture and argued that the district 
court’s decision should have been affirmed.355  Justice Crothers claimed 
that the majority disregarded the clearly erroneous standard of review and 
instead took over the district court’s fact-finding role when it chose to set 
aside the district court’s findings.356  Justice Crothers argued that the major-
ity overlooked the district court’s findings of fact and instead concluded 
that a joint venture existed based on facts that the majority found more per-
suasive.357  Justice Crothers recognized that there was no written contract 
between the parties, that the scope of the enterprise was unclear, and that 
the district court made many findings that demonstrated the improbability 
of a joint venture relationship.358 
Additionally, Justice Crothers stated that even if the facts that the ma-
jority determined persuasive did constitute a joint venture, the majority 
erred by presuming that the parties did not limit their duty of loyalty, so 
long as the limitation is not unreasonable.359  Justice Crothers stated that in 
North Dakota, partners, and therefore joint venturers, are allowed to limit 
their duty of loyalty.360  Further, Justice Crothers argued that North Dakota 
does allow for the limitation of the duty of loyalty.361  With that, Justice 
Crothers stated that when the majority assumed that the full amount of 
loyalty existed, it failed to determine whether a loyalty limitation occurred 
among the parties.362 
 
352. Id. ¶ 24 (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
353. Id. ¶ 23. 
354. Id. ¶ 24. 
355. Id. 
356. Id. ¶ 26, 747 N.W.2d at 525 (citing Klein v. Larson, 2006 ND 236, ¶ 35, 724 N.W.2d 
565, 575 (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
357. Id. ¶¶ 24, 26, 747 N.W.2d at 524-25. 
358. Id. ¶ 28, 747 N.W.2d at 525. 
359. Id. ¶ 27 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-13-03(2) (2007)). 
360. Id.  (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-13-03(2) (2007)). 
361. Id. ¶ 27. 
362. Id. 
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Justice Crothers concluded that the standard of review necessary for 
finding joint venture relationships required the court to allow the district 
court to be the fact-finder.363  Additionally, Justice Crothers argued that 
when determining the fiduciary duties, the majority failed to discuss 
whether the duty of loyalty could have been limited by the parties.364  While 
Justice Crothers concurred with the majority’s determination that a 
partnership did not exist, Justice Crothers dissented from the majority’s 
holding that found a joint venture existed and fiduciary duties were 
breached.365 
IV. IMPACT 
In Sandvick v. LaCrosse, the North Dakota Supreme Court broadened 
the definition of a joint venture.366  In its decision, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court held that a joint venture existed, even when all of the 
elements of a joint venture were not shown.367  The Sandvick holding will 
likely affect those parties who do not intend to enter into joint venture 
relationships and the courts that determine whether joint venture relation-
ships exist.368 
Currently, North Dakota oil and gas projects are booming.369  A 
significant amount of oil has is being developed in western North 
Dakota.370  With that, many agreements are being made and many business 
ventures are developing.371  Sandvick will likely impact these agreements, 
because of the North Dakota Supreme Court’s broad definition of a joint 
venture.372  Parties are strictly obligated to one another in these types of 
relationships, because the principles of partnership law, including fiduciary 
duties, do apply to joint venturers.373  As a result of the court’s broadening 
of the definition of a joint venture, more parties will likely be involved in 
 
363. Id. ¶ 28, 747 N.W.2d at 526. 
364. Id. ¶ 27, 747 N.W.2d at 525. 
365. Id. ¶¶ 13, 28, 747 N.W.2d at 523, 525. 
366. See id. ¶ 13, 747 N.W.2d at 523. 
367. Id. 
368. See id. 
369. Dale Wetzel, Soaring Oil Production to get Another Boost, GRAND FORKS HERALD, 
Nov. 9, 2009, at A1. 
370. Id.  The Bakken oil formation covers parts of North Dakota, Montana, and southeastern 
Saskatchewan. Id.  There is an estimated 271-503 billion barrels of oil located in this formation. 
Id. 
371. Id. 
372. See Sandvick, ¶¶ 11-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23 (discussing the process by which the 
North Dakota Supreme Court determined that a joint venture existed). 
373. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (articulating the strict fidu-
ciary duties that are owed in partnerships and joint ventures). 
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these types of relationships and, consequently, more people will owe these 
stringent fiduciary duties.374  Amidst the development of oil and gas 
projects, Sandvick should, and most likely will, impact the way people 
conduct business in North Dakota.375 
Although entering into partnerships and joint ventures without know-
ledge has been possible for parties in the past, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court made it much easier for parties to establish the formation of a joint 
venture by concluding that a joint venture existed without finding an 
agreement or contract.376  Those who desire to purchase an oil lease without 
the desire to commit themselves to a business entity, must be especially 
careful when forming relationships to lease land and mineral interests.377  
To avoid unknowingly entering into joint venture relationships, parties need 
to do more than state that they are not involved in a joint venture relation-
ship.378  While voicing that a joint venture does not exist may be indicative 
of non-formation, a mere statement, that is, magic words, will not be suffi-
cient to determine the existence of a joint venture.379  The court will look to 
the actions of the parties, not simply the words exchanged.380  Therefore, to 
avoid the possibility of unknowingly forming a joint venture relationship, 
those who do not want to be a part of a joint venture must be careful not to 
allow any indication that could be interpreted as an affiliation with another 
person or group.381 
Furthermore, North Dakota district courts are now obligated to follow 
the North Dakota Supreme Court’s holding, and joint venture relationships 
 
374. See Sandvick, ¶¶ 11-19, 747 N.W.2d at 522-24 (noting that broadening the scope of 
joint venture relationships increases the likelihood of more joint ventures). 
375. See id., ¶¶ 11-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23 (discussing the process by which the North 
Dakota Supreme Court determined that a joint venture existed); Jerome R. Corsi, Billions of Gal-
lons of Oil in North Dakota, Montana Geological Survey Calls Fine Largest Reserves Outside 
Alaska, WORLDNETDAILY, Apr. 13, 2008, available at http://www.worldnetdaily.com/index.php? 
fa=PAGE.view&pageId=61488 (last visited July 15, 2009) (discussing the Bakken Formation and 
its potential impact on North Dakota). 
376. See Sandvick, ¶ 13, 747 N.W.2d at 523 (noting that the absence of an agreement or con-
tract will not preclude the recognition of a joint venture relationship). 
377. See id. (displaying that a joint venture can exist even when elements essential to a joint 
venture are not met). 
378. See Nichols, supra note 119, at 435 (explaining that joint venture relationships can be 
formed without a written agreement, so long as some type of intent can be inferred). 
379. See id. at 434 (displaying that the court will look to both the words and the actions of 
the parties when determining intent). 
380. See id. (establishing that a court will not only look to the words exchanged, but also the 
actions of the parties). 
381. See id. at 434-35 (discussing what the court will look to when determining whether in-
tent to form a joint venture exists). 
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will likely be found to exist in more circumstances.382  By looking at these 
relationships in such a broad way, the Sandvick court seemed to blur the 
line between where a joint venture relationship existed and where it did 
not.383  The vagueness surrounding the North Dakota Supreme Court’s 
determination of a joint venture relationship will likely result in increased 
litigation, because more relationships will fit under this broad joint venture 
definition.384 
Sandvick will affect many people in North Dakota.385  In broadening 
the definition of a joint venture, the North Dakota Supreme Court deter-
mined that joint venture relationships may be more easily established.386  
Sandvick should impact the way people conduct business in North Dakota, 
especially with the increasing possibility of numerous parties entering into 
arrangements in the development of the oil and gas industry.387 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Sandvick, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a partnership 
relationship was not present between the parties, but that a joint venture re-
lationship existed.388  The North Dakota Supreme Court mentioned the dis-
trict court’s findings with regard to Sandvick, but determined different facts 
were more significant.389  Additionally, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
defined the elements necessary to establish a joint venture.390  However, 
when certain elements were not met and the North Dakota Supreme Court 
still found that a joint venture was established, the North Dakota Supreme 





382. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1215 (8th ed. 2004).  Binding precedent is defined as 
“[a] precedent that a court must follow.  For example, a lower court is bound by an applicable 
holding of a higher court in the same jurisdiction.” Id. 
383. See Sandvick, ¶ 13, 747 N.W.2d at 523 (holding that a joint venture existed when all of 
the elements were not met). 
384. See id. (holding that a joint venture existed when all of the elements were not met). 
385. See Sandvick, ¶ 13, 747 N.W.2d at 523 (holding that a joint venture did not exist and 
thus illustrating that the court has developed a more broad definition of joint venture which will 
likely affect more North Dakotans). 
386. See id. ¶¶ 11-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23 (discussing the process in which the North 
Dakota Supreme Court determined that a joint venture existed). 
387. Id.; see Corsi supra note 375 (articulating on the vast amount of oil found in North 
Dakota). 
388. Sandvick, ¶ 1, 747 N.W.2d at 520. 
389. See id. ¶¶ 12-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23. 
390. Id. ¶ 11, 747 N.W.2d at 522. 
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venture.391  This decision will likely influence future determinations of joint 
venture relationships, as well as future business transactions regarding oil 
and gas leases in North Dakota.392 
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391. See id. ¶¶ 11-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23 (holding that a joint venture existed). 
392.  See discussion supra Part IV (discussing the impact that Sandvick could have on North 
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